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INTRODUCTION 
The father of the American law school, Christopher Columbus Langdell, 
famously conceptualized the law as akin to science.1 On this account, legal 
doctrine was a series of scientific truths that judges systematically revealed 
over time. Decades later, the Legal Realists took issue with Langdell’s rigid 
conception of legal development.2 In their view, law was not simply a set of 
formal doctrines that was applied neutrally. Instead, the Legal Realists 
argued that real world concerns—including politics—informed the 
application and evolution of legal doctrine.3 Judges thus were not scientists, 
faithfully applying doctrine in an evenhanded way, but rather keen political 
actors who could—and did—manipulate doctrine to achieve desired 
outcomes.4 
Today, almost 150 years after Langdell elevated legal doctrine to the 
status of scientific truth, this Symposium questions whether doctrine 
survives in the present day, or if it has been completely subordinated to the 
exigencies of contemporary situations, as the Legal Realists claimed. I 
approach these questions from the domain of family law, where the 
circumstances that animate case law are often deeply idiosyncratic and 
particularized. As Leo Tolstoy observed (in a nonlegal context), “Happy 
families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”5  
Despite the idiosyncratic nature of families and family life, most family 
law scholars and practitioners would agree that there is a robust body of 
family law doctrine, as evidenced by the work of federal and state courts 
and the many efforts to codify various family law principles into statutes. 
While this growing body of state and federal law6 plays an important role in 
 
1 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 L.Q. REV. 118, 124 (1887) 
(declaring that “law is a science”). As early as 1871, Langdell had taken a similar position. See 
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS, at vi (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1871) (“Law, considered as a science, consists of 
certain principles or doctrines. . . . Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow 
degrees; in other words, it is a growth, extending in many cases through centuries.”).  
2 For a discussion of Legal Realism, see generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT 
YALE, 1927–1960 (1986). 
3 See id. at 164 (discussing the legal realist view that the personalities and past experiences of 
judges—as opposed to legal rules—play a paramount role in the development of legal doctrines). 
4 Id. 
5 LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 3 (Leonard J. Kent & Nina Berberova eds., Constance 
Garnett trans., Modern Library 2000) (1877). 
6 Traditionally, state statutes and adjudications by state tribunals have been regarded as the 
principal sources of family law doctrine. See, e.g., Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 197, 197 (1999) (“Under our federalist system, the axiom has it, family law resides 
within the province of the states.”); Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
1787, 1821 (1995) (“From the earliest days of the Republic until the recent past, family law has 
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the adjudication and resolution of familial disputes, it is not the only source 
of family law doctrine. 
In this Article, I offer a more nuanced view of the field and the role of 
doctrine in it. Although there is a robust body of family law doctrine, 
including judge-made case law,7 various state family law codes,8 federal 
statutory law,9 and federal constitutional law,10 as well as the model codes that 
 
unquestionably belonged to the states.”). Over time, however, a growing number of federal actors 
have participated in the articulation of family law principles and doctrines. See Judith Resnik, 
“Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1721 
(1991) (noting that although state law directly regulates families, “federal law does govern a host of 
legal and economic relations that do affect and sometimes define family life”). 
7 See generally, e.g., Family Law in the Fifty States 2011–2012: Case Digests, 46 FAM. L.Q. 543 
(2013) (compiling examples of case law developments in areas such as adoption, child support, and 
custody). 
8 See, e.g., Family Law in the 50 States, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/family_ 
law/resources/family_law_in_the_50_states.html (last visited May 12, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/GT84-PXTB (summarizing family law statutes in each state, including statutory 
provisions related to alimony, custody, child support, property division in divorce, and visitation 
rights). 
9 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266 (2012) (making domestic abuse a federal crime when the 
perpetrator crosses state lines); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A 
(2012) (extending full faith and credit to child custody determinations); Child Support 
Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669 (2012) (establishing national program to aid states in 
developing and implementing child support enforcement policies and procedures); Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5106i (2012) (establishing comprehensive 
federal program directed toward the prevention and treatment of child abuse and neglect); Family 
Violence Prevention and Services Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401–10415 (2012) (providing federal funding 
to states to address the problem of family violence); Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic 
Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 553, 108 Stat. 3518, 4056-57 (repealed 1996) 
(prohibiting state agencies from denying foster or adoptive placements solely on the basis of race). 
10 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-32 (1989) (plurality opinion) 
(upholding a statutory presumption that a child born to a married woman living with her husband 
is the husband’s child and allowing only the husband or wife to rebut that presumption); Palmore 
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431-34 (1984) (holding that concern for the effects of racial prejudice 
cannot justify removing a child from the custody of an otherwise fit parent); Mills v. Habluetzel, 
456 U.S. 91, 99-102 (1982) (invalidating a state statute providing that a paternity suit for purposes 
of obtaining child support for an illegitimate child must be brought within one year of birth); 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that a state may terminate the rights of 
natural parents only if it can “support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence”); 
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-94 (1979) (striking down a state statute permitting an 
unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of their child by withholding 
consent); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266-76 (1978) (upholding a state law conditioning the 
inheritance of illegitimate children from their father on a filiation order made during father’s 
lifetime); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin statute 
requiring residents subject to child support orders to obtain court approval before marrying); 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1978) (holding that equal protection does not require 
that the unwed father of an illegitimate child have the same authority as a married or divorced 
father to veto adoption); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-506 (1977) (striking 
down a city housing ordinance barring extended family members from living together); Stanton v. 
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often inspire law reform,11 the legal rules that these forms enshrine often 
assume and privilege a particular family model—marriage and the biological 
family produced in marriage. When families depart from the marital and 
biological model on which these doctrines rest, the assurances and 
predictability of legal doctrine evaporate. In these circumstances, the 
question of doctrine—of legal truths—becomes deeply contested as courts 
confront scenarios that require them to grapple with the fraught question of 
how to apply doctrine in light of real world concerns and the particular 
circumstances of litigants’ lives.  
This aspect of family law is perhaps most evident in the recent shift 
toward a more functional understanding of the family.12 In recent years, 
courts and policymakers have taken affirmative steps to recognize the way 
in which groups may function in the manner of families—and indeed, may 
consider themselves to be family—even where they have not comported 
with the formal indicia that traditionally are used to establish family 
status.13 For example, in the 1986 case Braschi v. Stahl Associates, the New 
York Court of Appeals concluded that two gay men could be considered 
“family members” for purposes of a local rent control ordinance because 
they comported themselves in the manner of spouses.14 Similarly, in 2002, 
the American Law Institute published its Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution, which relied on a more functional understanding of the family in 
 
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-17 (1975) (striking down a state child support statute providing that 
daughters attain majority at eighteen but sons attain majority at twenty-one); Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645, 649-59 (1972) (holding that the state was barred from taking custody of the children 
of an unwed father, absent a hearing and particularized finding that the father was an unfit 
parent); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967) (striking down state laws prohibiting interracial 
marriage). 
11 See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994) (providing a model adoption code); UNIF. MARI-
TAL PROP. ACT (1983) (providing a model framework for establishing the shared property rights 
of both spouses during a marriage and upon dissolution); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973) 
(providing a model code for determining parentage).  
12 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Leaving Home? Domicile, Family, and Gender, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1453, 1484 (2014) [hereinafter Appleton, Leaving Home] (“Function and performance of 
‘family’ have become important criteria for legal recognition, diminishing the once exclusive 
emphasis on formalities, such as ceremonial marriage.”). 
13 See, e.g., Hann v. Hous. Auth., 709 F. Supp. 605, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (concluding that an 
unmarried couple and their children were a family for purposes of public housing eligibility); 
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116, 122-23 (Cal. 1976) (recognizing a contract for support between 
unmarried cohabitants).  
14 See 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (“Appellant and Blanchard lived together as perma-
nent life partners for more than 10 years. They regarded one another, and were regarded by friends 
and family, as spouses.”). 
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order to identify basic principles for guiding disputes involving, among 
other things, relationship dissolution and child custody.15  
Critically, however, this functional turn has involved more than just 
efforts to resolve familial disputes in a more equitable fashion. In addition, 
courts have gradually integrated the emphasis on function into family law 
doctrine itself.16 That is, the emphasis on function is not merely a 
supplement to the family law that was originally organized around the 
formal categories of marriage, biological parenthood, and heterosexuality. 
Instead, the functional turn has actually reshaped the law, embedding the 
logic of functionality into the doctrine itself. Thus, in trying to move 
beyond doctrine, courts actually have transformed the doctrine so that these 
exceptions have become part of the rules that govern everyone. 
To elaborate on these observations, this Article offers a case study of the 
evolution of the doctrine of legal parenthood in California to show how 
courts have grappled with the fixed doctrine of parenthood and the rapidly 
changing realities of family life. In 1975, California adopted provisions of 
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), codifying them, with some modest 
modifications, as part of its Family Code.17 The UPA was rooted in the 
assumption that parent–child relationships would emerge within marital 
families or, if not, through nonmarital heterosexual reproduction.18 But 
California’s doctrine of legal parenthood quickly confronted the complica-
tions of modernity.19 Technological advances in the science of reproduction, 
coupled with changes in the demographics of family life, pushed the boundaries 
 
15 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS §§ 2.01, 3.01 (2002) (explaining that these guiding principles encompass both formal and 
functional conceptions of family). 
16 See Appleton, Leaving Home, supra note 12, at 1486-87 (“Exemplifying family law’s 
functional turn, concepts such as de facto parents, parents by estoppel, psychological parents, 
intent-based parenthood, and in loco parentis status can establish legal parentage based on parenting 
conduct.” (citations omitted)).  
17 Provisions of the UPA are now codified in California’s Family Code. See CAL. FAM. CODE 
§§ 7600–7730 (West 2004 & Supp. 2013). 
18 See Jenny Wald, Legitimate Parents: Construing California’s Uniform Parentage Act to Protect 
Children Born Into Nontraditional Families, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 139, 142 
(2005) (noting that the UPA “did not anticipate all of the future permutations in the creation of 
biological and social families,” such as lesbian and gay families, but instead focused on parentage in 
the context of heterosexual relationships). 
19 See, e.g., Megan S. Calvo, Note, Uniform Parentage Act—Say Goodbye to Donna Reed: Recog-
nizing Stepmothers’ Rights, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 773, 787-88 (2008) (noting that the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc), involved “a 
situation that was unforeseen when the UPA was drafted”). 
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of the legal doctrine of parenthood, prompting courts to adapt doctrinal 
rules to account for the realities of family life.20  
Although these changes produced reappraisals of family law doctrine, 
courts nevertheless emphasized—and indeed, entrenched—crucial assump-
tions associated with the traditional marital family. In particular, even as 
courts credited departures from the traditional marital family configuration 
in their interpretations of the UPA, they nonetheless emphasized the degree 
to which these families comported with the basic structure and functions of 
the marital family.21 Moreover, in interpreting the various provisions of the 
UPA, courts underscored a traditional function of the marital family—the 
privatization of support and care of children.22 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief history of 
the UPA, including its adoption and codification in California in 1975. Part II 
then traces the California courts’ evolving interpretations of certain UPA 
provisions in a series of cases involving the determination of parentage. 
Over time, California courts revised and modified existing interpretations 
of these statutory provisions in order to accommodate changes in 
technology and in the structure of the family. But even as the courts’ 
interpretations of these statutory provisions evolved, what remained 
consistent was the underlying commitment to the marital family form, the 
two-parent dyad, and the privatization of dependency within the family. 
Part III explores these commitments to marriage, the marital family, and 
 
20 See id. at 787 (discussing Johnson, where the California Supreme Court interpreted 
California’s UPA provisions to hold “that when both the genetic relationship with the child and 
gestation of the child do not abide in one woman, the woman who intended to create and raise the 
child is the legal mother”). 
21 See, e.g., Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 
932, 940-41 (Cal. 2002) (vesting legal parenthood in a man who was not biologically related to the 
child on the grounds that he had functioned in the manner of a father, living with the child and 
the child’s mother and holding the child out as his own since the child’s birth); Kern Cnty. Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. Monica G. (In re Salvador M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 708-09 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(determining, in circumstances where the biological parents were unavailable, that a half-sister was 
a presumed mother because she had taken care of the child since birth and raised him as her own); 
L.A. Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677, 
681-83 (Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing a woman who was not biologically related to the child as a 
presumed mother because she had held the child out as her own for years). 
22 See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293 (Ct. App. 
1998) (noting that parentage determinations are intended in part to identify those who are 
“obligated to provide maintenance and support for the child”); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, 
Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 347, 360 (2012) 
[hereinafter Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex] (noting that while the UPA reflected a desire to 
remove the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate birth, its focus on identifying parents 
inside and outside the marital family “pav[ed] the way for the increasing privatization of 
dependency”). 
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the privatization of dependency within the family. As I argue, these 
commitments, perhaps more so than case law and statutory text, reveal the 
true doctrinal framework that has undergirded—and continues to define—
family law.  
I. CREATING A DOCTRINE OF LEGAL PARENTHOOD—CALIFORNIA’S 
ADOPTION OF THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT 
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court began dismantling the legal 
impediments that traditionally attended illegitimate birth. In Levy v. 
Louisiana23 and a companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability 
Insurance Co.,24 the Court struck down state laws that prohibited illegitimate 
children and their parents from recovering under wrongful death claims.25 
According to the Court, the distinction drawn between marital and nonmar-
ital birth had no rational relationship to the purpose and administration of 
the wrongful death statutes at issue.26 Instead, the Court found that the 
distinctions invidiously discriminated against children born out of wedlock, 
punishing them for their parents’ “sin[s].”27  
The Court’s decisions in Levy and Glona and their progeny have been 
credited with ushering in a sea change in the legal approach to illegitimacy.28 
Although some scholars debate the extent to which the Supreme Court’s 
illegitimacy jurisprudence was revolutionary,29 it certainly influenced the 
law of parentage. Partly in response to the Court’s illegitimacy decisions, 
 
23 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
24 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
25 Id. at 75-76; Levy, 391 U.S. at 72. 
26 See Glona, 391 U.S. at 75 (“[W]e see no possible rational basis for assuming that if the 
natural mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of 
illegitimacy will be served.” (citation omitted)). 
27 Id. (noting that punishing the “sin” of nonmarital sex is the historical reason for the crea-
tion of legal impediments based on illegitimacy). 
28 See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws 
for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 211-12 (2009) 
(noting that in the wake of Levy, Glona, and their progeny, the “legal doctrine of ‘illegitimacy’ had 
all but disappeared”).  
29 See Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 413 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, New Illegitimacy] (“Levy and Glona do not 
represent a broad shift in law’s understanding of illegitimacy. Instead, both cases are entirely 
consistent with law’s persistent skepticism of non-marriage and its veneration of marriage and the 
marital family.” (citation omitted)); see also Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution 
of the Non-Marital Family, 103 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 104) (on file with 
author) (“By focusing on the blamelessness of children, these decisions not only obscured the 
constitutional harms of illegitimacy penalties’ detrimental impact on adults, they ignored how 
these laws reinforced broader racial, sexual, and socioeconomic inequities that impoverished entire 
families.”). 
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the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
promulgated the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) in 1973.30 In keeping with 
the Supreme Court’s skepticism of illegitimacy as a basis for distinguishing 
between individuals, the UPA sought to remove distinctions based on the 
parents’ marital status at the time of the child’s birth while also providing 
ways to establish paternity in circumstances involving unmarried fathers.31  
California, like many states, adopted a modified version of the UPA in 
1975.32 As Senator Anthony Beilenson, the author of California’s version of 
the UPA, noted at its passage, the new law struck “the entire concept of 
‘illegitimacy’ . . . from California’s law books.”33 The California law 
“repeal[ed] all legal references to legitimacy and illegitimacy and 
substitute[d] the concept known as the ‘parent and child relationship’ which 
will be used in the future.”34 
In this regard, the UPA looked beyond marriage to provide multiple 
ways to determine parentage. Women could establish maternity in the 
traditional way through gestation and birth.35 But establishing paternity 
required more. In the case of marital births, the UPA deployed the tradi-
tional marital presumptions in place in most American jurisdictions, which 
presumed a woman’s husband to be the father of any child born to her 
during the course of the marriage or within three hundred days of its 
termination.36 For nonmarital births, however, rather than relying on a 
presumption based on the horizontal relationship between two adults, the 
 
30 See Polikoff, supra note 28, at 211 (noting that the critiques of illegitimacy influenced the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which in turn led to the 
promulgation of the UPA). Importantly, Harry Krause, an architect of the effort to dismantle legal 
impediments based on illegitimacy, was also integrally involved in the development of the UPA. 
Id. at 209-211; see also Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families, and Fantasy: The Legacy of 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TUL. L. REV. 585, 589-90 (1991) (discussing Krause’s role in the 
UPA’s drafting). 
31 See Wald, supra note 18, at 140 (“The primary purpose of the [UPA] was to eliminate the 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children.”). 
32 Jessica Hawkins, My Two Dads: Challenging Gender Stereotypes in Applying California’s Recent 
Supreme Court Cases to Gay Couples, 41 FAM. L.Q. 623, 625 (2007). 
33 Anthony C. Beilenson, Op-Ed., Archaic Injustice Eliminated, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1975, at 
F5. 
34 Id. 
35 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3(1) (1973) (“The parent and child relationship between a 
child and . . . the natural mother may be established by proof of her having given birth to the 
child.”); see also Wald, supra note 18, at 141 (“Because the fact of maternity was obvious, social 
motherhood—a mother’s relationship with her child—was inextricably linked to a woman’s 
biological relationship to her child.”). 
36 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4–6 (1973). Meaningfully, the UPA permitted the presump-
tion to be rebutted in certain circumstances. See id. § 4(b) (explaining that a “court decree 
establishing paternity of the child by another man” would rebut the presumption). 
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UPA fashioned new presumptions based on the parent–child relationship, 
including biological connections37 and the father’s conduct toward the 
child.38  
A critical aspect of the UPA and its adoption in California and 
elsewhere was the link between establishing parentage and the attachment 
of child support obligations.39 Indeed, as Susan Frelich Appleton has 
argued, many of the changes in the treatment of unmarried fathers and 
nonmarital children were driven by private welfare concerns.40 If marriage 
provided a private welfare system for those children born to married 
parents, the UPA’s provisions attempted to construct an analogous system 
of privatized support by establishing paternity—and attaching the 
obligation of child support—in nonmarital families through the recognition 
of biological connections and conduct.  
Although the UPA responded to the growing rate of nonmarital 
families, it did not anticipate other tectonic shifts in family life. For 
example, the statute barely acknowledged the emergence of assisted 
reproductive technologies (ARTs). Indeed, the statute’s one nod to this 
aspect of modernity was its provisions relating to the use of artificial 
insemination.41 But even there, its contemplation of insemination as a route 
to parenthood struck a traditional note. The UPA presumed that 
insemination would occur within the context of the marital family. It 
provided that the husband of a woman receiving artificial insemination 
under a physician’s supervision was presumed to be the legal father of the 
 
37 See id. § 12 (“Evidence relating to paternity may include . . . evidence of sexual intercourse 
between the mother and alleged father at any possible time of conception.”). 
38 See id. § 4(a)(4) (providing that paternity can be established by a man who “receives the 
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child”). 
39 See Harry D. Krause, The Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 8 (1974) (discussing the 
UPA’s “guiding principle” that all children have an equal interest in establishing their right to a 
relationship with—and support from—both parents); see also Paula Roberts, Biology and Beyond: 
The Case for Passage of the New Uniform Parentage Act, 35 FAM. L.Q. 41, 42 (2001) (“[R]esolving 
parentage issues has economic implications for the public. Many of the benefits of establishing 
parentage whether for marital or nonmarital children are monetary. In the absence of financial 
support, a child may need public assistance.”). 
40 See Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, supra note 22, at 360 (“If the Supreme Court’s decisions 
and the 1973 UPA were child-focused—developments designed to help children of unmarried 
parents achieve parity with other children—they also offered welcome changes for the state itself, 
paving the way for the increasing privatization of dependency.”). In fact, one of the major 
illegitimacy cases concerned nonmarital children’s rights to support. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 
535, 538 (1973) (per curiam) (“[O]nce a State posits a judicially enforceable right on behalf of 
children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient 
justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not 
married its mother.”). 
41 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973). 
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child born.42 In adopting various provisions of the UPA, however, 
California made a critical change to the model code’s terms, modifying the 
provisions dealing with paternity in the context of artificial insemination to 
allow unmarried women to use physician-supervised artificial insemination 
without vesting the sperm donor with the status of legal father.43  
In time, however, it became clear that technology, as well as the 
changing demographics of family life, might lead to circumstances in which 
the factors relevant to determining parentage could point in different 
directions.44 How, then, to resolve the puzzle of parenthood? California 
adopted section 4(b) of the UPA, which provided that if two or more 
presumptions arose, “the presumption which on the facts is founded on the 
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”45 This provision left 
much discretion to judges dealing with the often complex factual 
circumstances of modern families. In addition, the UPA instructed that, 
“[i]nsofar as practicable, the provisions . . . applicable to the father and child 
relationship apply” to establishing the mother–child relationship.46 
Accordingly, presumptions applicable to fathers could apply to mothers. 
But as Part II makes clear, even with these guidelines, the California UPA’s 
provisions were often inadequate to resolve the pressing issues that arose in 
the idiosyncratic circumstances of family life. In such situations, doctrine 
could be a guide—and even a tool—for resolving such disputes, but other 
interests would also be important decisional factors. 
II. PUZZLING OVER PARENTHOOD—THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
CALIFORNIA UPA IN CASE LAW 
When California adopted the UPA in 1975, the model act reflected an 
interest in eliminating distinctions between marital and nonmarital chil-
dren.47 By emphasizing biological connections and conduct as critical indicia 
 
42 See id. § 5(a) (“If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of 
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, the 
husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”). 
43 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 1994) (“The donor of semen provided to a licensed 
physician and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s wife is 
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”). 
44 See Calvo, supra note 19, at 787-88 (discussing the facts of Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 
(Cal. 1993) (en banc), where the court confronted conflicting claims to motherhood—one from the 
surrogate who actually gave birth to the child and the other from the biological egg donor). 
45 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 1994); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(b) (1973). 
46 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21 (1973). California adopted and codified this provision of the 
UPA into its Family Code, at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (West 2004). 
47 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 (1973) (“The parent and child relationship extends equally 
to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.”); see also id. § 2 
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of parenthood, the UPA diminished the importance of marriage for estab-
lishing legal parentage.48 Additionally, the emphasis on biology and conduct 
as means of establishing parentage provided the state with alternatives—
beyond marriage—for identifying private sources of support for children.49  
But while the UPA reflected shifts in the composition of family life, it 
assumed that traditional heterosexual reproduction would be the primary 
conduit to parenthood.50 As ARTs emerged, California courts struggled to 
adapt the UPA’s provisions to the rapidly shifting terrain that these new 
modes of reproduction created.51 
A. Johnson v. Calvert 
In Johnson v. Calvert,52 the California courts grappled with the fraught 
question of how to determine parentage in circumstances involving new 
reproductive technologies. After a hysterectomy left her unable to carry a 
pregnancy to term, Crispina Calvert and her husband, Mark, decided to 
pursue in vitro fertilization (IVF) and surrogacy.53 In 1990, the Calverts 
entered into a surrogacy contract with Anna Johnson, a paid gestational 
surrogate. The contract provided that an embryo created using the Calverts’ 
genetic material would be implanted in Johnson for gestation.54 In exchange 
for $10,000 and a $200,000 life insurance policy, Johnson would bear the 
child and, upon birth, relinquish “all parental rights” to the child to the 
Calverts.55 By the time the child was born, however, relations between the 
Calverts and Johnson had deteriorated.56 Shortly after the birth, the 
 
cmt. (“[T]he major substantive sections of the Act[] establish the principle that regardless of the 
marital status of the parents, all children and all parents have equal rights with respect to each 
other.”); Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, supra note 22, at 381 (“The 1973 UPA set forth a network of 
parentage presumptions applicable to children to whom the presumption of legitimacy did not 
apply.”). 
48 Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, supra note 22, at 360. 
49 See id. (noting that although the UPA was “designed to help children of unmarried parents 
achieve parity with other children,” its emphasis on biology and conduct as conduits to parenthood 
also permitted new paths for “the increasing privatization of dependency”). 
50 In 2000, in an attempt to remedy this oversight, the UPA was amended by responding 
directly to the challenges presented by improved genetic testing and the proliferation of ARTs. 
See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 cmt. (2002) (“Article 7 only applies to children born as the 
result of assisted reproductive technologies . . . .”). 
51 See Calvo, supra note 19, at 787 (“[E]ven prior to its amendment, the Supreme Court of 
California applied the UPA to a situation that was not considered when it was drafted.”). 
52 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). 
53 Id. at 778. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
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Calverts and Johnson all filed actions to be recognized as the legal parents 
of the child.57  
In framing their claims, the parties looked to the UPA provisions that 
governed the determination of maternity.58 The Calverts, who had 
furnished their genetic material to create the embryo to be implanted and 
gestated, based their claim on genetics.59 Conversely, Johnson based her 
claim on her status as the gestational mother.60 By the terms of the statute, 
which provided that the mother–child relationship “may be established by 
proof of . . . having given birth to the child,”61 Johnson appeared to have the 
stronger claim. The trial court, however, prioritized genetics, noting that 
while Johnson had given birth to the child, the Calverts were the child’s 
“genetic, biological and natural” father and mother.62 Accordingly, Johnson 
had no “parental” rights to the child, and the surrogacy contract was legal 
and enforceable against her claims.63 An intermediate appellate court 
affirmed the trial court decision, and Johnson appealed to the California 
Supreme Court.64  
The California Supreme Court acknowledged the complexities of the 
situation: “Both women . . . ha[d] adduced evidence of a mother and child 
relationship as contemplated by the Act.”65 In other words, Johnson was a 
mother because she had birthed the child, while Crispina Calvert was a 
mother by virtue of her biological connection to the child. The trouble, of 
course, was that the statute reflected “the ancient dictum mater est quam 
[gestation] demonstrat (by gestation the mother is demonstrated).”66 As such, 
the statute’s understanding of maternity was one in which gestation and 
genetics coincided. The statute did not contemplate the complications that 
 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 777-78. Critically, the parties’ decisions to frame their arguments with reference to 
the UPA were animated, at least in part, by the broad skepticism of surrogacy agreements that 
emerged after the Supreme Court of New Jersey found surrogacy contracts to be unenforceable in 
In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248-50 (N.J. 1988). Following the controversial decision, courts were 
reluctant to make doctrine around surrogacy contracts. In this regard, any impulse toward shifting 
family law doctrine in a more contractual direction was effectively foreclosed by the Baby M 
backlash and the ensuing effort to reroute surrogacy disputes through the UPA. For a discussion of 
this dynamic, see generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2009). 
59 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. 
60 Id. 
61 CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1) (West 1991) (current version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) 
(West 2004)). 
62 Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. 
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 Id. at 781. 
66 Id. (citation omitted). 
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surrogacy and ARTs would present, and thus did not foresee the possibility 
that maternity might one day be bifurcated such that one woman would be a 
child’s genetic mother, while another would be its gestational mother.  
Confronted with just this situation, the Johnson court retreated from 
statutory text and the scientific truths upon which it was based. The court 
reasoned that “while gestation may demonstrate maternal status, it is not 
the sine qua non of motherhood.”67 In the face of a statutory impasse, the 
court turned its attention to “the parties’ intentions.”68 Although the court 
refused to address the issue of the surrogacy agreement’s enforceability,69 it 
found the agreement relevant for discerning the parties’ intentions 
regarding the child.70 The surrogacy agreement made clear that the Calverts 
“affirmatively intended the birth of the child” and that Crispina Calvert 
“from the outset intended to be the child’s mother.”71 
The Johnson court’s articulation of “intentional parenthood” marked a 
profound shift in the determination of parentage. Nevertheless, even as it 
broke new ground, the California Supreme Court hewed to the traditional 
model of dual parentage in rendering its decision.72 While the court 
discussed the parties’ intentions at length, it spent hardly any time at all 
considering the prospect of vesting legal parenthood in three different 
people.73 Indeed, the possibility of a child with three legal parents was an 
unorthodox—and unwelcome—outcome. Vesting any of the legal incidents 
of parentage in Anna Johnson would invariably “come only at Crispina’s 
expense,” and would intrude upon the Calverts’ “procreative choices and 
their relationship with the child.”74 In short, the prospect of three, rather 
than two, parents would be disastrous, “necessarily detract[ing] from or 
impair[ing] the parental bond” between the Calverts and their child.75  
The court’s resistance to the prospect of three legal parents gestures 
toward two distinct, but related, concerns. On one hand, the court’s 
opposition to three legal parents evinced a preference for the familiar 
two-parent dyad. And critically, the parental dyad (and the preference for 
 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 782. 
69 Id. at 784. 
70 Id. at 782. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 781 n.8 (“To recognize parental rights in a third party with whom the Calvert family 
has had little contact since shortly after the child’s birth would diminish Crispina’s role as 
mother.”). 
73 See id. (“We decline to accept the contention . . . that we should find the child has two 
mothers.”).  
74 Id. at 786. 
75 Id.  
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it) reflected deep-seated assumptions that heterosexual marriage and 
biological reproduction would—and should—be the most common conduits 
to parenthood. Dividing parenthood among three persons was a clear 
departure from the traditional family model; tellingly, the court, in its 
concern for “the parental bond”76 between the Calverts and the child, made 
clear that dividing parenthood between more than two people could 
threaten the traditional family structure by inserting an unwelcomed 
interloper into the bosom of the family. 
But even as the court’s disdain for dividing parenthood among three 
people signaled a preference for the traditional family model, it also 
reflected a traditional function of the marital family: the privatization of 
dependency within the family unit. Although the Johnson court did not 
mention it explicitly, it likely weighed the appeal of a stable marital family 
against the prospect of three people all vying for a say in the child’s 
upbringing or the prospect of Anna Johnson raising the child on her own. 
With this calculus in mind, it is unsurprising that the court preferred the 
Calverts, who had planned for the child and sought to raise it together 
within a traditional marital family structure, over Johnson. The (perceived) 
economic and emotional stability of the intact marital family was likely 
preferable to the uncertainty posed by three competing parental claims or 
the prospect of single motherhood. 
B. In re Marriage of Buzzanca 
Though a preference for the marital family and the privatization of 
dependency was not explicitly expressed in the court’s disposition of 
Johnson, it soon emerged as a critical interest in other cases involving 
parentage determinations. In In re Marriage of Buzzanca,77 a married couple, 
John and Luanne Buzzanca, had an embryo implanted in a surrogate.78 
Unlike the circumstances in Johnson, the embryo was not genetically related 
to the Buzzancas.79 Shortly after the child, Jaycee, was born, the Buzzancas 
ended their marriage, setting the stage for a lawsuit to determine 
parentage—and financial responsibility—for Jaycee.80  
At trial, all of the parties—the Buzzancas, the surrogate, and the 
surrogate’s husband—stipulated that, because they had no genetic 
relationship to the child, they were not “biological” parents within the 
 
76 Id.  
77 Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998). 
78 Id. at 282. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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meaning of the UPA.81 Although Luanne Buzzanca claimed that she and 
John were the lawful parents under Johnson’s theory of intentional 
parenthood, John “disclaimed any responsibility” for the child, “financial or 
otherwise.”82 As the trial court explained, because John had not 
“contributed the sperm” and thus “had no biological relationship to the 
child,” he was not the child’s legal father and owed no obligations for the 
child’s care and upkeep.83 On this logic, the trial court reached “an 
extraordinary conclusion: Jaycee had no lawful parents.”84 
On appeal, the intermediate court immediately invoked Johnson’s logic 
of intentional parenthood, using it to inform its own interpretation of the 
UPA’s provisions.85 According to the appellate court, the trial court had 
focused unduly on whether there was a biological relationship between John 
and Jaycee, completely neglecting “the substantial and well-settled body of 
law holding that there are times when fatherhood can be established by 
conduct apart from giving birth or being genetically related to a child.”86 In 
the appellate court’s view, although the Buzzancas were genetically 
unrelated to Jaycee, their intentions and conduct provided a basis for 
vesting them with the rights and obligations of parenthood.87 Accordingly, 
Luanne Buzzanca was the child’s lawful mother because she “caused Jaycee’s 
conception and birth by initiating the surrogacy arrangement.”88 And if 
Luanne was Jaycee’s mother, then John, her husband at the time of the 
surrogacy agreement and implantation, was the legal father.89  
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court analogized the 
Buzzancas’ circumstances to the statutory provisions concerning artificial 
insemination in the context of an intact marriage. By the UPA’s terms, “[i]f, 
under the supervision of a licensed physician and surgeon and with the 
consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen 
donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he 
were the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”90 Analogizing surrogacy 
 
81 Id.  
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See id. (“The same rule which makes the husband the lawful father of a child born because 
of his consent to artificial insemination should be applied here—by the same parity of reasoning 
that guided our Supreme Court in [ Johnson]—to both husband and wife.”).  
86 Id. (second emphasis added). 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 291. 
89 See id. (“John caused Jaycee’s conception every bit as much as if things had been done the 
old-fashioned way.” (citation omitted)). 
90 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 1994). 
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to artificial insemination and invoking the traditional marital presumption, 
the appellate court concluded that in a situation involving “a man and 
woman who were married at the time of conception and signing of the 
surrogacy agreement,” the rights and obligations of parenthood could 
attach, even in the absence of a biological connection.91 
But even as the Buzzanca court wedded the logic of intentional 
parenthood to statutory presumptions that were informed by marriage and 
marital conduct,92 it also prioritized more quotidian concerns. Recall that 
the trial court reached the “extraordinary” conclusion that Jaycee was a 
“legal orphan” with no parents.93 The intermediate appellate court 
immediately identified the flaw in this logic. With no lawful parents, the 
child—and the burden of her upkeep—would “fall on the taxpayers.”94 It is 
little wonder that the Buzzanca court blended the UPA’s marital 
presumptions with Johnson’s intentional parenthood doctrine to avoid the 
unappealing outcome of a child left dependent on the state for her upkeep. 
After all, as the Buzzanca court noted, the UPA’s provisions were 
promulgated with an eye toward ensuring “that parents will live up to their 
support obligations,” rather than “leaving the task to the taxpayers.”95  
C. In re Nicholas H. and In re Karen C. 
As in Buzzanca, the prospect of a child dependent on the state for his 
care and provision informed the court’s disposition of In re Nicholas H.96 In 
many ways, Nicholas H. exemplified family law’s functionalist turn, as the 
facts of the case perfectly captured the changing demographics of the 
family, as well as marriage’s diminished role as a conduit to parenthood. 
The case involved Thomas and Kimberly, who had become a couple while 
Kimberly was pregnant by another man.97 After the child, Nicholas, was 
born, Thomas and Kimberly lived together and raised Nicholas together, 
 
91 Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287 & n.11. 
92 The Buzzanca court’s interpretation of the UPA’s presumptions in tandem with Johnson’s 
notion of intentional parenthood was consistent with an earlier decision, Moschetta v. Moschetta (In 
re Marriage of Moschetta), 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Ct. App. 1994). There, the court “decline[d] to 
enforce the traditional surrogacy contract . . . because to do so would mean we would have to 
ignore both the analysis used by our Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert and the adoption statute 
that requires a formal consent to a child’s adoption by his or her birth mother.” Id. at 901. 
93 Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282, 284. 
94 Id. at 284. 
95 Id. at 290. 
96 Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 
2002). 
97 Id. at 934. 
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though they never married.98 In time, the relationship soured amidst 
Kimberly’s drug use and incarceration, and episodes of domestic violence.99 
Because of Kimberly’s instability, a juvenile court removed Nicholas from 
her care.100 Thomas petitioned for custody of the boy, but Kimberly 
objected on the ground that because Thomas was not the boy’s biological 
father, he could not claim parental rights.101 Thomas conceded that he had 
no biological connection to Nicholas,102 but argued that under 
section 7611(d) of California’s UPA, “the father-son relationship he ha[d] 
developed with Nicholas qualified him as a presumed father.”103 The 
juvenile court credited Thomas’ functionalist argument;104 an intermediate 
appellate court, however, rejected the conduct-based claim to parentage 
because “the presumption set forth in section 7611 is a presumption that a 
man is the natural, biological father of the child in question.”105 Because 
Thomas admitted that he had no biological connection to Nicholas, the 
presumption established under section 7611(d) was, in the appellate court’s 
view, rebutted.106  
The California Supreme Court disagreed and reversed.107 It explained 
that the intermediate appellate court erred in concluding that the absence of 
a biological connection between Thomas and Nicholas “necessarily rebutted 
[section 7611(d)’s] presumption.”108 Although section 7611(d)’s presumption 
could be rebutted by evidence that the claimant lacked a biological connec-
tion to the child, by the UPA’s terms, such a rebuttal could be deployed 
only “in an appropriate action.”109 According to the court, the circumstances 
were not an appropriate action in which to rebut the presumption of 
parenthood.110 
 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 934-35.  
100 Id. at 935-36. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
126, 128 (Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002); cf. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 1994) 
(providing that a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if “[h]e receives the child into 
his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child”). 
104 See Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 935 (“[T]he juvenile court found that the presumption under 
7611(d) that Thomas was Nicholas’s natural father had not been rebutted.”). 
105 Nicholas H., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141. 
106 Id. at 142. 
107 Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 934, 941. 
108 Id. at 935. 
109 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(a) (West 1994). 
110 Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 934. 
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But what made the circumstances inappropriate for rebutting the 
presumption of biological parenthood? As the court noted, Nicholas’s 
biological parents were unavailable to care for him.111 Unemployed and 
frequently homeless, Kimberly was “a frail reed for Nicholas to lean 
upon.”112 And while Kimberly had named a former partner, Jason, as 
Nicholas’s biological father, “Jason ha[d] not come forward to affirm that 
claim, and, indeed, ha[d] not even been located.”113 In this regard, Thomas 
was “the constant in Nicholas’s life.”114 Rebutting section 7611’s 
presumption for lack of a biological connection would render Nicholas 
“fatherless and homeless.”115 Faced with the grim prospect of a child who 
would otherwise become a ward of the state, the court interpreted the 
UPA’s provisions broadly enough to allow a man with no biological 
connections to establish paternity based solely on his conduct over time.116  
A few months later, in In re Karen C.,117 a California intermediate 
appellate court built upon Nicholas H., applying its logic in a gender-neutral 
fashion to conclude that a woman who raised a child given to her at birth by 
another woman could similarly be the child’s presumed parent under 
section 7611.118 As in Nicholas H., the Karen C. court evinced a deep 
discomfort with the prospect of rejecting a claim of legal parenthood in 
circumstances where doing so would render the child a legal orphan.119 At 
bottom, the court noted, “[t]he judicial determination of paternity is . . . a 
mixture of a search for genetic truth and the implementation of the strong 
public policies favoring marriage and family stability, and disfavoring labels 
of illegitimacy.”120 With these concerns in mind, a judgment establishing 
parentage need not be rooted in biological truths. To reach an optimal 
 
111 See id. at 934 (discussing the “harsh result” that would ensue if the court based parentage 
solely on the biological relationship).  
112 Id. at 935. 
113 Id. at 936. 
114 Id. at 935. 
115 Id. at 934. 
116 See id. at 941 (concluding that the California legislature, in enacting the UPA provisions 
allowing for the rebuttal of a man’s presumed status as a natural father, was “unlikely to have had 
in mind an action like this . . . in which no other man claims parental rights to the child”). 
117 L.A. Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. Leticia C. (In re Karen C.), 124 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct. App. 2002). 
118 See id. at 680-81, 683 (summarizing Nicholas H., determining that its “principles should 
apply equally to women,” and vacating the lowers court’s order denying the existence of a mother–child 
relationship). 
119 See id. at 679 (noting that “Karen has effectively been made an orphan” and therefore “she 
has an obvious interest in a legal determination of whether Leticia is her mother”). 
120 Id. at 680. 
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outcome for the child and ensure the privatization of support, the 
determination of parenthood could, in some cases, “be a decretal fiction.”121 
D. K.M. v. E.G. and Elisa B. v. Superior Court 
Critically, both Nicholas H. and Karen C. were juvenile dependency 
cases, a posture that perhaps explains the courts’ interest in establishing 
parenthood, even in the absence of a biological connection. In most 
dependency cases, the failure to identify an appropriate legal guardian will 
result in the child becoming a ward of the state. But even as the dependency 
context likely colored the decisions in Nicholas H. and Karen C., the 
interpretations of the UPA that prevailed in those cases proved instructive 
outside of the dependency context—including in circumstances involving 
the parentage rights of same-sex couples.122 
In K.M. v. E.G., K.M. provided her ova so that they could be fertilized 
with sperm from an anonymous donor.123 The resulting embryos were 
implanted in her lesbian partner, E.G., who became pregnant and carried 
the resulting twins to term.124 When their relationship ended, E.G. argued 
that, despite the use of K.M.’s ova, the couple had undertaken IVF with the 
understanding that E.G. would be the sole parent of any resulting 
children.125 Indeed, as the Court of Appeal noted, California’s version of the 
UPA specifically provided for the prospect of single motherhood by 
extinguishing the parental claims of anonymous sperm donors who 
provided genetic material for artificial insemination.126 On this view, the 
lower court concluded that K.M. was akin to an anonymous sperm donor, 
who under section 7613(b) was not considered “the natural [parent] of a 
child thereby conceived.”127  
K.M., by contrast, claimed that regardless of the law’s provisions for 
single parenthood, she and E.G. planned to raise any resulting children 
together128—indeed, they had raised their children together until their 
 
121 Id.  
122 See infra notes 123-168 and accompanying text. 
123 117 P.3d 673, 676 (Cal. 2005). 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 676. 
126 See id. at 677 (noting that the Court of Appeal observed that “the status of K.M. . . . . is 
consistent with the status of a sperm donor under the [Uniform Parentage Act], i.e., treated in law 
as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived” (omission and alteration in 
original)); see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2004) (“The donor of semen provided to a 
licensed physician and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor’s 
wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.”). 
127 See supra note 126. 
128 K.M., 117 P.3d at 679. 
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relationship ended.129 In this regard, K.M. not only had a biological connec-
tion to the children E.G. had birthed, she also had received them into her 
home and held them out as her own. Accordingly, K.M. argued that she was 
a parent under both the doctrine of intentional parenthood established in 
Johnson and section 7611(d) of the California UPA.130 
At trial and on the initial appeal, the courts credited E.G.’s 
interpretation of the statute.131 Those courts held that K.M.’s status “was 
analogous to that of a sperm donor, who is treated as a legal stranger to a 
child.”132 Neither court made much of K.M.’s claim that she was a presumed 
parent under section 7611(d) because she had received the children into her 
home and held them out as her natural children.133 Nor did the lower courts 
entertain K.M.’s argument that she and E.G. had intended to parent the 
twins jointly and that E.G. was thus estopped from now denying K.M.’s 
claim to parenthood.134 According to the Court of Appeal, “substantial 
evidence supports the trial courts [sic] factual finding that only E.G. 
intended to bring about the birth of a child whom she intended to raise as 
her own.”135  
The California Supreme Court, however, took a different approach, 
concluding that K.M. was a legal parent.136 In so holding, it drew on past 
precedents interpreting California’s UPA, including Johnson and 
Buzzanca.137 As in Johnson, both K.M. and E.G. had biological connections 
to the children. K.M., who furnished ova for the IVF procedure, was the 
genetic mother, while E.G., who bore the children, was the gestational 
 
129 Id. at 676-77. 
130 Id. at 677, 679; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2004) (presuming that one is a 
natural parent of a child if “[h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as 
his natural child”). 
131 K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 139 (Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).  
132 K.M., 117 P.3d at 677.  
133 See id. at 683 (“The [trial] court further ruled that K.M. did not meet the statutory defi-
nition of a ‘presumed’ mother [under section 7611(d)] because she had failed to meet both prongs 
of the statutory test: receiving the children into her home, and holding them out as her natural 
children. Although K.M. had received the twins into her home, she had not held them out as her 
natural children . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 682 (“In light of our conclusion that section 
7613(b) does not apply and that K.M. is the twins’ parent (together with E.G.), based upon K.M.’s 
genetic relationship to the twins, we need not, and do not, consider whether K.M. is presumed to 
be a parent of the twins under [section 7611(d)] . . . .”). 
134 See id. at 677 (noting the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that at the time of conception, 
both parties intended for E.G. to be the sole mother and parent, and therefore any changes to the 
agreement after the birth did not alter the original scheme).  
135 Id.  
136 Id. at 682. 
137 See generally id. at 678-82 (discussing California’s UPA and its interpretation in these two 
cases). 
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mother.138 Using Johnson as a template, the K.M. court shifted its focus from 
biology and genetics to examine the parties’ intentions.139 In Johnson, as in 
Buzzanca, the fact that the couples were married at the time their children 
were conceived was crucial to the determination of parentage because it 
evinced their intent to procreate and parent jointly as a couple.140 The facts 
of K.M. seemed similar. Although K.M. and E.G. were ineligible to marry 
in California, they were registered as domestic partners under a municipal 
domestic partnership scheme141—a fact that, for the court, underscored the 
way in which the couple functioned as a traditional family and “intended to 
produce a child that would be raised in their own home.”142 With Johnson 
and Buzzanca as guides, the K.M. court relied on biology and genetics, 
filtered through the lens of intent, to declare both K.M. and E.G. to be 
mothers under the UPA.143  
But irrespective of intent to procreate and jointly parent in a committed, 
state-recognized relationship, there were other reasons that counseled in 
favor of recognizing K.M. as a parent—reasons that required the court to 
retreat from an important aspect of its decision in Johnson. Recall that the 
Johnson court roundly dismissed Anna Johnson’s claim of maternity in favor 
 
138 See id. at 678 (“K.M. asserts that she is a parent of the twins because she supplied the ova 
that were fertilized in vitro and implanted in her lesbian partner . . . .”).  
139 See id. at 679 (“The circumstances of the present case are not identical to those in Johnson, 
but they are similar in a crucial respect; both the couple in Johnson and the couple in the present 
case intended to produce a child that would be raised in their own home.”).  
140 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (emphasizing that the 
parents were a married couple who sought to raise a child together within their marriage); 
Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(emphasizing the mother’s and father’s consent as the basis for their legal-parent status in cases of 
both artificial insemination and birth by surrogate mothers). 
141 For a discussion of California municipal domestic partnership schemes, see Melissa 
Murray, Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went from Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 291, 294-300 (2013) [hereinafter Murray, Paradigms Lost]. 
142 K.M., 117 P.3d at 679. In truth, the court made much—perhaps too much—out of the 
parties’ registered partnership. As I have explained elsewhere, municipal domestic partnerships are 
not—and were not—equivalents of marriage. See Murray, Paradigms Lost, supra note 141, at 295 
(noting that municipal domestic partnership schemes “were not necessarily intended to be close 
approximations of marriage”). In most cases, these municipal regimes offered a modest comple-
ment of benefits—not the full panoply of benefits and expectations attendant to marriage. Id. 
Indeed, E.G. argued that she and K.M. had entered into the municipal domestic partnership 
solely for the purpose of providing K.M. access to E.G.’s gym membership. Respondent’s Answer 
Brief on the Merits at 3, K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005) (No. 02-0777). 
143 See K.M., 117 P.3d at 681 (concluding that K.M. and E.G.’s parental claims are “not 
mutually exclusive” because “K.M. does not claim to be the twins’ mother instead of E.G., but in 
addition to E.G.”); see also id. at 682 (concluding that section 7632 does not permit a “woman who 
supplies ova to be used to impregnate her lesbian partner . . . [to] waive her responsibility to 
support that child”).  
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of Crispina Calvert’s.144 Confidently declaring that “California law recog-
nizes only one natural mother,”145 the Johnson court “rejected the suggestion 
that . . . the child could have two mothers.”146 Instead, it relied on intent to 
decide between the two women’s competing claims.147  
In K.M., the court beat a hasty retreat from Johnson’s categorical impera-
tive.148 Although Johnson cautioned against recognizing two mothers, the 
K.M. court made clear that this logic was inapt in circumstances involving 
same-sex partners.149 As the court explained, “our decision in Johnson does 
not preclude a child from having two parents both of whom are women.”150 
Thus while Johnson resisted finding more than two parents, K.M. resisted 
finding fewer. 
Although K.M. departed from Johnson by finding two mothers, the 
court’s logic was consistent with the longstanding interest in ensuring a 
stable family and stable, private sources of financial support for children. 
This factor was less explicit in K.M. than in Buzzanca, Nicholas H., and 
Karen C., where the courts were faced with the prospect of children who 
would be wards of the court. In K.M., the financial circumstances were not 
nearly as dire.151 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the K.M. court had 
two options: it could either determine that K.M. was a parent, thus 
providing the children with two parents (and two sources of support), or it 
could credit E.G.’s reading of the UPA, which established her as the sole 
parent of—and sole source of support for—her children.152  
Given the connections between determining parentage and securing 
private sources of support for children, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
K.M. court decided the case in a manner that ensured two parents—and two 
sources of support—rather than one. In this way, the determination of 
parentage was as much about attaching obligations as it was about 
 
144 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (finding Anna’s biological connection insufficient to establish a 
“mother and child relationship”).  
145 Id. at 781. 
146 K.M., 117 P.3d at 681 (discussing Johnson); cf. id. (distinguishing Johnson’s facts and holding 
that “K.M.’s parentage is determined by the usual provisions of the UPA”). 
147 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (relying on the “parties’ intentions as manifested in the surro-
gacy agreement” to determine maternity). 
148 See K.M., 117 P.3d at 681 (noting that the “Johnson intent test does not apply when ‘[t]here 
is no “tie” to break’” (quoting Moschetta v. Moschetta (In re Marriage of Moschetta), 30 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 893, 896 (Ct. App. 1994))).  
149 See id. (noting that the facts were distinguishable from Johnson because “both K.M. and 
E.G. can be the children’s mothers”).  
150 Id. (quoting Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005)). 
151 As an initial matter, K.M. was not a dependency case. 
152 K.M., 117 P.3d at 682 (prioritizing the child’s right to support and concluding that a parent 
cannot sign a “waiver [that] effectively cause[s] that woman to relinquish her parental rights”).  
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establishing rights. Furthermore, in choosing to credit K.M.’s reading of the 
UPA and the extant case law over E.G.’s interpretation, the court 
subordinated a reading of the UPA that enabled the creation of single-parent 
families in favor of a broader public policy that prioritized the two-parent 
family and the privatization of support.  
The interest in encouraging two-parent families and facilitating the 
privatization of support was even more explicit in Elisa B. v. Superior 
Court,153 which the California Supreme Court heard as a companion case to 
K.M. In Elisa B., Elisa and Emily were committed partners who wished to 
raise a family together.154 Using Emily’s ova and donor sperm, the couple 
pursued IVF and Emily eventually gave birth to twins.155 After their 
children were born, the couple organized their household along traditional 
lines.156 Emily left the workforce to remain at home, while Elisa worked to 
support the family.157 Within a few years, however, the couple ended their 
relationship. Although Emily continued to support the household for a 
time, she eventually lost her job and was no longer able to contribute 
financially.158 In order to support her children, Emily filed for public 
assistance.159 When the county filed suit against Elisa to hold her financially 
responsible for the children, Elisa argued that she was not a legal parent 
because she was not biologically related to the twins.160 
The California Supreme Court thought otherwise. Relying on its deci-
sion in Nicholas H., the court held that Elisa was a legal parent under 
section 7611(d) of the UPA because “she received the children into her 
home and openly held them out as her natural children.”161 Critically, the 
couple’s marriage-like relationship furnished the backdrop against which the 
court determined that Elisa was a lawful parent with attendant child 
support obligations. As the court explained, the couple 
introduced each other to friends as their “partner,” exchanged rings, opened 
a joint bank account, and believed they were in a committed relationship.  
 
153 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).  
154 Id. at 663. 
155 Id.  
156 See id. (explaining that the couple decided that Emily would be the “stay-at-home 
mother” and Elisa the “primary breadwinner”).  
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 663-64; see also id. at 672 (Kennard, J., concurring) (noting that shortly after losing 
her job, Elisa informed Emily that “because she no longer had a full-time job she could not 
continue to support Emily and the twins”). 
159 Id. at 672 (Kennard, J., concurring).  
160 Id. at 664 (majority opinion). 
161 Id. at 670. 
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Elisa and Emily discussed having children and decided that they both 
wished to give birth. Because Elisa earned more than twice as much money 
as Emily, they decided that Emily “would be the stay-at-home mother” and 
Elisa “would be the primary breadwinner for the family.” At a sperm bank, 
they chose a donor they both would use so the children would “be biological 
brothers and sisters.”162  
For the court, Elisa’s behavior in the context of a long-term, marriage-like 
relationship made clear that she and Emily had planned to have and raise 
children together. Regardless of the lack of a biological connection, Elisa’s 
behavior signaled her intent to function as a parent.  
In this respect, the circumstances of Elisa B. were consistent with those 
in Nicholas H., where the court also concluded that biology was no barrier to 
determining parenthood in circumstances where the individual functioned 
in the manner of a parent in the context of a conjugal relationship.163 But 
critically, the circumstances departed from Nicholas H. in a way that made 
the recognition of Elisa’s parental status even more appropriate. The Elisa 
B. court observed that, unlike Thomas and Kimberly in Nicholas H.,  
Elisa did not meet Emily after she was pregnant, but rather was in a com-
mitted relationship with her when they decided to have children together. 
Elisa actively assisted Emily in becoming pregnant, with the understanding 
that they would raise the resulting children together. Having helped cause 
the children to be born, and having raised them as her own, E[lisa] should 
not be permitted to later abandon the twins simply because her relationship 
with Emily dissolved.164  
Thus, it was not just that Elisa had held the children out as her own, as 
Thomas had in Nicholas H. Rather, like the Calverts and the Buzzancas, 
Elisa and Emily deliberately had taken steps to conceive children and raise 
them as a family in the context of a long-term relationship. This, as much as 
her post-birth conduct, made Elisa a parent in the court’s eyes. Just as John 
Buzzanca could not disclaim his obligations to Jaycee after consenting to the 
surrogacy arrangement,165 Elisa could not now shirk her obligations to the 
children she helped create.  
 
162 Id. at 663. 
163 Id.; cf. Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 
932, 933 (Cal. 2002) (discussing a rebuttable presumption of parentage that arises when a man 
“receives a child into his home and openly holds the child out as his natural child”).  
164 Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670. 
165 See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text. 
  
2015] Family Law’s Doctrines 2009 
 
Emily’s precarious financial situation also weighed heavily in the court’s 
decision. Tellingly, Emily and their children were dependent on public 
assistance.166 Such circumstances were exactly what the UPA was promulgated 
to avoid. As the court explained, “the paternity presumptions are driven, 
not by biological paternity, but by the state’s interest in the welfare of the 
child and the integrity of the family.”167 When the UPA was drafted, 
biological paternity provided the vehicle to further the state’s interest in 
privatizing the welfare of children.168 But as these cases suggest, over time, 
California courts constructed a model of parenthood that was not 
dependent on biology alone. This model of parenthood was not only more 
expansive in its understanding of parenthood, it offered multiple routes for 
privatizing dependency and attaching parental obligations of support. 
E. Jason P. v. Danielle S. 
The most recent case to consider the UPA’s parentage provisions, Jason 
P. v. Danielle S.,169 involved an unmarried couple who relied on assisted 
reproductive technology in their quest to become parents. Jason and 
Danielle tried to have a baby naturally, but after many complications, 
turned to IVF.170 Shortly thereafter, Danielle moved out of the home she 
shared with Jason, purchased sperm from an anonymous sperm donor, and 
began “to pursue motherhood as a single mother.”171 She began by 
researching her rights as a “single mother by choice,”172 learning that under 
California law, “a man who gives his sperm for artificial insemination is 
never treated in the law as though he is the father.”173 Eventually, however, 
the couple reconciled and Jason gave Danielle a letter explaining that 
although “he was not ready to be a father,” Danielle “had his blessing” to 
use his sperm to conceive “as long as she did not tell others.”174 With these 
 
166 Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 672 (Kennard, J., concurring).  
167 Id. at 668 (majority opinion) (quoting Kern Cnty. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Monica G. 
(In re Salvador M.), 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 708 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
168 See Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, supra note 22, at 360 (noting that the identification and 
recognition of unmarried fathers paved the way for increased privatization of dependency).  
169 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Ct. App. 2014). 
170 Id. at 791. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. The term “single mother by choice” has been popularized by the group “Single 
Mothers by Choice.” For a discussion of the group and its aims, see SINGLE MOTHERS BY 
CHOICE, http://www.singlemothersbychoice.org (last visited May 12, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9WA7-TULR. For a critique of the group and its terminology, see Murray, New 
Illegitimacy, supra note 29, at 414-15. 
173 Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 791. 
174 Id. at 792.  
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caveats issued, Danielle used Jason’s sperm to become pregnant via IVF.175 
Their son, Gus, was born in December 2009.176 According to Jason, the 
couple raised Gus together, and Jason publicly assumed a paternal role in 
Gus’s life until 2012, when Danielle ended the relationship.177 
When the relationship ended, Jason petitioned to establish his parental 
rights.178 Danielle objected, arguing that under section 7613(b), Jason was a 
sperm donor and therefore ineligible to be legally recognized as Gus’s 
father.179 In response, Jason contended, among other things, that 
section 7613(b) did not apply to a man who was in a relationship with the 
woman who was using his sperm to conceive via IVF.180 He further argued 
that he was a presumed parent under section 7611(d) because he had taken 
Gus into his home and held him out to others as his natural child.181  
In rendering its decision, the trial court relied on an earlier California 
appellate decision, Steven S. v. Deborah D.182 There, a biological father was 
denied the opportunity to establish paternity because, although he had been 
in a relationship with the child’s mother, the child was conceived using 
sperm that he had provided to a licensed physician for the purpose of 
artificially inseminating the mother.183 According to the Jason P. trial court, 
the facts in Jason P. were consistent with those of Steven S., in that “Jason’s 
semen was provided to a licensed physician and surgeon, that Gus was 
conceived through IVF using Jason’s sperm, and that [Jason] and Danielle 
were never married.”184 According to the trial court, these facts, taken 
together, “conclusively established that section 7613(b) applies.”185 Because 
section 7613(b) was the “exclusive means of determining paternity in cases 
involving sperm donors and unmarried women,” the trial court held that 
Jason could not establish paternity as a presumed parent under 
section 7611(d).186 
 
175 Id.  
176 Id.  
177 See id. (describing the evidence that Jason presented concerning his involvement in Gus’s 
upbringing during the first years of the child’s life). 
178 Id. at 791.  
179 Id. 
180 Id.; see also id. at 792-93 (describing the trial court’s rejection of “Jason’s argument that 
section 7613(b) does not apply”). 
181 Id. at 791-93. 
182 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482 (Ct. App. 2005). 
183 Id. at 484.  
184 Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 792. 
185 Id.  
186 Id. at 793. 
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On appeal, Jason contended that sections 7613(b) and 7611(d) operated as 
independent grounds for establishing paternity.187 By this logic, even if 
section 7613(b) applied, Jason could still establish paternity under 
section 7611(d).188 Danielle, however, contended that, in keeping with the 
decision in Steven S., Jason, as a mere sperm donor, was precluded from 
establishing parentage “under any theory.”189 The appellate court disagreed, 
noting that in Steven S., the “only issue . . . was whether section 7613(b) 
applied when the sperm donor is an intimate friend and sexual partner of 
the mother.”190 The Steven S. court did not confront the question “whether 
section 7613(b) precluded a finding of parentage under section 7611 or any 
other theory.”191 
The critical question, then, was whether the two provisions interacted in 
such a way that the application of one provision necessarily precluded 
application of the other. Although prior decisions had not offered the 
opportunity to consider sections 7613(b) and 7611(d) in tandem, nothing 
established that the two provisions were mutually exclusive. Indeed, the 
Jason P. court concluded, reading the two provisions together, “with 
reference to the entire scheme of law,”192 would “promote rather than defeat 
the [UPA’s] general purpose, . . . avoiding a construction that would lead to 
absurd consequences.”193 According to the court, section 7613(b) had been 
drafted for the purpose of allowing women, whether married or unmarried, 
to conceive via artificial insemination “without fear that the [sperm] donor 
may claim paternity.”194 Just as important, the provision “provided men 
with a statutory vehicle for donating semen to married and unmarried 
women alike without fear of liability for child support.”195  
By contrast, section 7611’s presumptions were drafted for the purpose of 
“distinguish[ing] between those fathers who have entered into some familial 
relationship with the mother and child and those who have not.”196 Unlike 
section 7613, which recognized that biology could be the basis of a parental 
relationship (and thus sought to deny parentage in circumstances involving 
sperm donors), section 7611 was guided by the understanding that “[a] 
 
187 Id.  
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 794. 
190 Id.  
191 Id.  
192 Id. at 795 (citation omitted). 
193 Id. (citation omitted).  
194 Id. (citation omitted). 
195 Id. (citation omitted). 
196 Id. at 796 (citation omitted). 
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biological connection to the child is not necessary for the presumption of 
paternity to arise.”197 In this regard, construing the statutes such that the 
application of section 7613(b) precluded the presumption of parenthood 
under section 7611(d) would “lead to unintended, and some might say 
absurd, consequences.”198 Under Danielle’s interpretation of the two 
statutes, an ex-husband who had fathered a child via artificial insemination 
would not be obligated “to support the child because he was a sperm donor 
under section 7613(b) and could not be found to be the child’s presumed 
father under section 7611, despite having been married to the mother at the 
time of the child’s birth and having raised the child as his own.”199 Such an 
interpretation would invariably lead to circumstances where children would 
be left without any sources of support (or with very limited sources of 
support), severely undermining the state’s interest in privatizing 
dependency. As the Jason P. court confidently asserted, “[t]he Legislature 
could not have intended this result.”200 In this way, as in K.M., the 
Jason P. court prioritized the recognition of two-parent families and the 
privatization of support over the UPA’s stated interest in facilitating single 
motherhood and other departures from the traditional model of marital 
parenthood.  
III. FAMILY LAW’S DOCTRINES 
In the 1970s, when the UPA was drafted and later adopted in California 
and other states, the model law’s interest in removing distinctions between 
marital and nonmarital birth, and in going beyond marriage as a conduit 
to establishing parentage, was widely regarded as a progressive development.201 
But even as the UPA marked a significant moment of progressive change in 
family law and policy by reducing the importance of marriage to 
establishing family rights and responsibilities, it did so by prioritizing 
biological connections and conduct that comported with behavior associated 
with the marital family. In so doing, California’s UPA—and the courts 
interpreting it—further reified, and indeed entrenched, certain aspects of 
marital family life.  
I raise these points because they respond to the essential question that is 
at the core of this Symposium: what is the role and place of legal doctrine 
 
197 Id.  
198 Id. at 796-97. 
199 Id. at 797. 
200 Id.  
201 See Wald, supra note 18, at 141 (discussing the UPA’s intention to “guarantee the equal 
rights of all children”).  
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today? In the family law context, as we have seen, doctrine abounds. But as 
California’s experience with the UPA suggests, doctrine is often 
ill-equipped to deal with the varied realities of quotidian life. When the 
UPA was drafted, it responded to a quite limited vision of family life. As 
the UPA’s drafters understood, families were being forged in and outside of 
marriage202—a development to which the extant family law, with its marital 
presumptions, remained stubbornly resistant. But even as the UPA tried to 
reboot family law for a new era, it immediately confronted the dramatic 
shifts in the terrain of family formation that ARTs and same-sex relationships 
posed.  
As the case law makes clear, in the face of modernity, resort to 
doctrine alone yielded unsatisfying—indeed, absurd—results. Accordingly, 
California courts molded the doctrine to meet the exigencies of the 
circumstances with which they were confronted. In Johnson and Buzzanca, 
the logic of intentional parenthood emerged to respond to the difficulties 
presented by surrogacy and ARTs. In Nicholas H., K.M., and Elisa B., 
doctrine was molded to accommodate circumstances scarcely contemplated 
at the time the UPA was drafted. In this regard, California’s experience 
with the UPA makes clear that doctrine does matter, but that doctrine can 
be interpreted and realigned in ways that comport with evolving 
circumstances. 
What is perhaps less obvious in these cases is the way in which 
“doctrine” operates on multiple levels in family law. All of the cases involve 
courts grappling with established doctrine in the form of judge-made case 
law and statutory provisions. But, as importantly, in all of the cases, the 
courts confront—and embrace—a set of doctrinal truths that informs and 
shapes the development of case law and the interpretation of statutes. 
Throughout the cases canvassed here, the California courts evince concern 
for three distinct but interrelated interests: (1) limiting parenthood to two 
persons, (2) establishing conjugal relationships as the essential context in 
which reproduction occurs, and (3) confirming the family’s role in privatizing 
dependency. I will say a bit about each of these in turn. 
Almost from the start, the development of ARTs raised the prospect of 
parenthood divided among more than the traditional husband–wife dyad. 
The anxiety surrounding multiple parenthood is most evident in Johnson, 
where two women vied to be recognized as the child’s mother.203 In Johnson, 
the court dismissed out of hand the prospect of recognizing two women as 
 
202 See Polikoff, supra note 28, at 211-12 (discussing the UPA’s focus on removing the distinc-
tion between marital and nonmarital children).  
203 See supra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.  
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the child’s mother.204 Crediting the claims of one woman would invariably 
diminish the rights of the other.205 The California Supreme Court later 
revisited this logic in K.M. This time, the court abandoned its resistance to 
the prospect of a child with two mothers, noting that parenthood could be 
divided between two persons, and that both of these persons could be of the 
same gender.206  
The K.M. court’s retreat from Johnson has largely been received as a 
progressive development.207 And in many respects, the court’s recognition 
that a child can have two legal parents of the same sex is progress. What this 
progress narrative masks, however, is the court’s underlying conservatism 
about family structure. Although the K.M. court happily recognized two 
women as legal mothers, it avoided the prospect of single motherhood and 
never admitted the possibility of multiple parenthood. Indeed, even as it 
expanded upon the traditional familial model to include two parents of the 
same sex, the court’s notion of parenthood was deeply rooted in the 
conventional two-parent dyad and the traditional heterosexual organization 
of the family.  
In this regard, the cases also evince an understanding that conjugal rela-
tionships, whether in marriage or outside of it, are the paradigmatic context 
in which reproduction occurs—and should occur. Recall that in Buzzanca, 
K.M., Elisa B., and Jason P., the fact that a child was conceived in the 
context of an intact relationship informed the court’s determination that the 
parties intended to raise the child jointly as co-parents.208 This development 
recalls the marital presumption that pervaded the law of parentage that 
preceded the UPA. At that time, the fact that a child was born to a woman 
 
204 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (noting that “for any child 
California law recognizes only one natural mother, despite advances in reproductive technology 
rendering a different outcome biologically possible”).  
205 See id. at 786 (“Any parental rights Anna might successfully assert could come only at 
Crispina’s expense.”).  
206 See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 681 (Cal. 2005) (distinguishing Johnson’s facts from its 
holding).  
207 See, e.g., Wald, supra note 18, at 153 (“Specifically, in [K.M.] the court held that when a 
couple deliberately brings a child into the world through the use of assisted reproduction, both 
partners are the parents, regardless of their gender or marital status.”). 
208 See, e.g., K.M., 117 P.3d at 675 (describing the relationship between the parents as a cohab-
itating partnership); Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789, 791 (Ct. App. 2014) (noting that 
Jason and Danielle “cohabitated for many years, but they never married”); Buzzanca v. Buzzanca 
(In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286 (Ct. App. 1998) (“If a husband who 
consents to artificial insemination . . . is ‘treated in law’ as the father of the child by virtue of his 
consent, there is no reason the result should be any different in the case of a married couple who 
consent to in vitro fertilization by unknown donors and subsequent implantation into a woman 
who is, as a surrogate, willing to carry the embryo to term for them.”).  
  
2015] Family Law’s Doctrines 2015 
 
in an intact marriage was sufficient to raise the presumption that the 
woman’s husband was the child’s father.209 The UPA, however, sought to 
expand the view of legal parentage beyond marriage to include those 
families formed through nonmarital relationships. Despite these aspirations, 
intuitions about marriage and marital family norms continued to influence 
and inform the courts’ view of nonmarital parenthood. As the case law 
suggests, the parties did not need to be married for the court to assume that 
reproduction was undertaken with the understanding that both parties 
would raise the child together. Instead, the mere fact that a conjugal 
relationship existed at the time the child was conceived was sufficient for 
the court to infer an intent to co-parent and confirm parental rights. 
Critically, the interest in limiting parenthood to two persons and recog-
nizing conjugal relationships as the appropriate context for reproduction 
both relate to another “truth” that is threaded throughout all of the cases. 
Concern for the financial provision of children shadows the cases and the 
courts’ dispositions of the issues. The emphasis on financial support as a 
crucial obligation and responsibility of parenthood is perhaps unsurprising. 
These concerns were present during the drafting of the UPA, when the 
interest in establishing parentage among unmarried couples was explicitly 
linked to identifying fathers for the purpose of imposing child support 
obligations.210 Put simply, the family has long been the principal means by 
which we privatize the dependency of children (and other vulnerable 
subjects), relieving the state of the obligation to do so.  
This essential truth of family life is laid bare in the resolution of cases 
like Buzzanca, Nicholas H., and Elisa B., where the courts were concerned 
about the prospect of interpreting legal doctrine in a manner that produced 
such “absurd[ities]”211 as children who were legal orphans or otherwise 
dependent on the state for their care and provision.212  
The impulse toward the privatization of dependency is perhaps less 
obvious in cases like Johnson and Jason P., where there was no immediate 
 
209 See Wald, supra note 18, at 140 (discussing common law marital presumptions, which 
aimed “to restrict childbearing to the confines of marriage”).  
210 See id. at 141 (noting that securing child support payments was a major policy goal of the 
UPA).  
211 Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 795 (citation omitted).  
212 See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 664 (Cal. 2005) (noting that the financial 
responsibility for the children rested with Elisa and was “not the responsibility of the taxpayer”); 
Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency v. Kimberly H. (In re Nicholas H.), 46 P.3d 932, 934 (Cal. 
2002) (noting that if paternity were not established for the nonbiological father, the “harsh result” 
would render the child “fatherless and homeless”); Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284 (noting the 
“lack of appeal for any result which makes [the child] a legal orphan”). 
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concern that the child would be rendered a ward of the state.213 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that concerns about the 
economic welfare of children do not pervade the decisions in these cases. 
Recall the Johnson court’s concern that recognizing Anna Johnson as a 
mother would invariably intrude upon the rights of Crispina Calvert and 
her husband.214 We might speculate that the court was not only concerned 
about the conflict of rights and its effect on the parties’ abilities to raise the 
child; it likely was also concerned that the Calverts would find the 
imposition of a third rights-holder untenable in the long run, perhaps 
prompting them to eventually surrender their rights to Johnson, who would 
be left as the sole source of support for the child. With these concerns in 
mind, one might attribute the court’s hostility to the prospect of three 
parents to a preference for the perceived economic stability of the marital 
family and a desire to protect this source of support from destabilizing 
forces. 
And this preference for the traditional family unit as a means of 
providing support for children may well explain the California Supreme 
Court’s retreat from Johnson in K.M. and Elisa B. In both cases, the court 
easily surmounted Johnson’s concern for vesting legal motherhood in two 
women by analogizing the litigants and their relationships to the 
heterosexual family unit.215 Parenthood was limited to two people, but both 
parents could be mothers. We might attribute the court’s about-face to a 
simple acknowledgement of modernity and the changing dynamics of the 
family. But crucially, the court’s decisions were about more than the 
increasing visibility of same-sex co-parents. The court was also likely 
swayed by the prospect of ensuring two sources of support for the child—of 
replicating the structure of the marital family, even if that structure was no 
longer rooted in heterosexual marriage and reproduction.216  
 
213 Notably, neither case was a dependency proceeding. In all circumstances, there were 
adults willing to care for the child. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (en banc); 
Jason P., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 791.  
214 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.  
215 See K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005) (noting that the mothers were in a 
domestic partnership); Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669 (describing the relationship’s traditional familial 
structure).  
216 Given the interest in privatizing support for children within the family, why were the 
California courts so disdainful of the prospect of multiple parenthood? After all, if two parents 
were important as sources of economic provision, three or more parents would further amortize 
the costs of dependency. One might argue that multiple parenthood posed risks associated with 
diffuse ownership rights—the classic tragedy of the commons. If a number of people were vested 
with the rights of parenthood, we might worry about whether all of them were performing their 
parental obligations at full capacity all of the time. We might also worry that an increase in the 
number of legal parents will lead to increased conflicts over child-rearing decisions, perhaps 
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But why was it so important for the court to assure two sources of 
support for children? The circumstances of Elisa B. suggest one pressing 
reason for affirming the two-parent dyad and the structure of the traditional 
family. Recall that in Elisa B., Emily, Elisa’s former partner, left the 
workforce to raise the couple’s children.217 When the relationship ended, 
Emily and the children were utterly dependent on Elisa for material 
support.218 When Elisa withdrew her support, Emily and her children 
became public charges, dependent on the state.219 These kinds of dire 
circumstances made the value of two parents obvious, at least to the court. 
Two parents, “rather than one,” could serve “as a source of both emotional 
and financial support”—especially in circumstances, like Elisa B.’s, “when 
the obligation to support the child would otherwise fall to the public.”220 In 
this regard, Elisa B. is not simply about reifying the two-parent dyad. It is 
about reifying the two-parent dyad as a means of ensuring that the family 
will continue, even in the event of relationship dissolution, to be a means 
for privatizing dependency. 
CONCLUSION 
All of these observations gesture toward an important insight: doctrine 
may take many forms in law. We might assume that “doctrine” is limited to 
case law, statutes, and regulations, but these cases suggest that, at least in 
the context of family law, there are other “doctrines” that form the 
backdrop against which law is interpreted, created, and received. Even as 
family law doctrine has attempted to respond to the changing nature of 
family life, certain truths remain fixed as bedrock principles that subtly—
and not so subtly—inform the work of judges and legislatures. In these 
cases, the prioritization of the two-parent dyad and conjugal relationships as 
the site for reproduction is undergirded by an interest in preserving the 
family (however constituted) as the means by which society provides and 
cares for its most vulnerable. With this in mind, the question whether 
doctrine survives as a force in legal decisionmaking is easy to answer. 
Obviously, doctrine matters. The harder question, of course, is which 
 
leading to instability in the family unit. Elizabeth Marquardt, a vocal critic of multiple 
parenthood, has voiced similar concerns. See Elizabeth Marquardt, Op-Ed., When 3 Really Is A 
Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at A13 (“Conflicts will undoubtedly arise when three parents 
confront the sticky, conflict-ridden reality of child-raising, often leading to a nasty, three-way 
custody battle.”). 
217 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.  
218 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.  
219 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
220 Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669.  
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doctrines matter—and how? As family law suggests, case law and statutes 
continue to be meaningful, but at their core, these doctrinal sources are 
informed and influenced by other core “truths.” 
